Motivation
The use of disaster robots in the aftermath of the Great East Japan earthquake serves as an excellent example of international cooperation between agencies, municipalities, universities and industry. However, the earliest use of robots occurred almost a month after the event. A prior study on the eight deployments worldwide in 2010 [1] reported that in four deployments, robots arrived on the scene in an average 0.5 days. These were situations where the authorities either already had robots or had agreements in place with agencies that had robots. In the remaining four incidents, the average time before the robots arrived was 7.5 days (mean 6.5 days). Five of the deployments were for the robot to search for survivors but the average time for the robot to arrive on scene was 4.2 days, well beyond the 3 day period for finding survivors who will return to health.
This article uses the experiences of the Center for Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue (CRASAR) in assisting with the Great East Japan earthquake response and recovery operations to illustrate the barriers to rapid, effective deployment and to make recommendations. CRASAR has been involved in responses to 15 disasters at the request of the appropriate authorities, starting with the 9/11 World Trade Center response in 2001. In 2008, it established the Roboticists Without Border program to identify and train volunteers from the robotics industry to participate in responses. Member companies are asked to donate up to 10 days of their time and their equipment for a response; CRASAR obtains travel funding and on some occasions salary reim- 
CRASAR Deployments and Involvement
CRASAR deployed three times to Japan, partnering with Westinghouse Electric at Fukushima Daiichi and the International Rescue System Institute (IRS) in Japan at Iwate and Miyagi prefectures, and assisted with an attempt through the Association for Unmanned Vehicles Systems International (AUVSI) to make UAVs widely available to Japanese industry.
1 Use of UAVs at Fukushima Daiichi
A Honeywell T-Hawk micro UAV was used at Fukushima by the Westinghouse Electric Company, a TEPCO subcontractor. Flights started on April 10, 2011, with a team of American and Japanese engineers and continued through June for over 40 missions. The T-Hawk was used to gather damage assessment video of the reactor buildings from angles not possible from the ground or satellite and provided radiological surveys of the area. Fig. 1 shows the initial Japan-USA team.
The involvement of the T-Hawks started through an informal network between members of Westinghouse and Honeywell. Both Honeywell and Westinghouse are 2. 2 Use of UMVs at Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures IRS and CRASAR deployed unmanned marine vehicles twice to Japan. The first deployment consisted of four remotely operated (tethered) unmanned marine vehicles (ROV): a SeaBotix LBV-300, a SeaBotix SARbot, a Seamore ROV, and an Access AC-ROV. These were fielded in Minamisanriku, Miyagi, and Rikuzentakata, Iwate, from April 18-24, 2011, for port clearing and victim recovery missions using sonar and video. The IRS-CRASAR team returned for further recovery work October 18-28, 2011, with a SeaBotix SARbot ROV and YSI EchoMapper AUV. The two deployments reopened the Minamisanriku New Port area six months earlier than projected, cleared the surrounding aquaculture areas, and conducted underwater victim recovery operations in shallow waters prohibited to divers in Rikuzentakata. In the second deployment, the SARbot ROV was able to cover 80,000 [m 2 ] in 6 hours, finding submerged wreckage and pollutants in areas previously marked clear by divers. Fig. 2 shows the Japan-US team at the April deployment. CRASAR was initially contacted by IRS on March 11, 2011, to provide resources, followed by a formal invitation from the Port of Hachinohe requesting assistance to inspect the port structure and clear ship channels on March 13. CRASAR identified three available robots and experts through its Roboticists Without Borders program. However, US State Department travel restrictions stemming from the nuclear emergency at Fukushima prevented CRASAR from immediately deploying. In the meantime, CRASAR applied for a National Science Foundation RAPID award to fund the mission, with a matching J-RAPID grant for IRS through the Japan Science and Technology Agency. A week later, the municipalities of Minamisanriku and Rikuzentakata also requested UMV assistance. However, the Japanese embassy had asked NSF to suspend sponsorship of scientists, as the disaster regions were being flooded with structural experts who were taking up valuable food, water, and transportation resources. The US and Japan embassies worked to approve CRASAR's entry as we had official invitations from municipalities and a plan for being self sufficient in the field. The travel restrictions were lifted in April and the CRASAR team departed a few days later, giving the team members time to leave their normal responsibilities in good order. There were no ITAR restrictions on the equipment.
3 Attempted Use of UAVs for Large Scale
Response and Recovery Operations Independently of the insertion of the T-Hawk UAV into the Fukushima Daiichi response, AUVSI and CRASAR attempted to provide UAVs to Japanese agencies and business through an innovative joint Japan-US commerce initiative. The concept proposed by John Lambert, AUVSI president, was to bring together US-based UAV companies and pilots and make these assets available for up to a year, thus enabling economic recovery. This concept focused on the use of UAVs beyond short term response and mitigation activities. Following the Roboticists Without Borders model, companies would initially donate time and vehicles, but if the UAVs were requested for longer term use they would be paid for. In addition, the concept including setting up a centralized maintenance camp for repairs and upgrades. The expectation was that the UAVs could provide damage assessment, document the volume of debris, detect changes in land use and water flow, and be available for innovative uses by businesses. However, requisite agreements between the US and Japan state departments were not completed and the concept was abandoned.
Observations
The experience with the Great East Japan earthquake leads to three observations. First, consistent with Ref. [1] , robots are not deployed quickly enough to assist with lifesaving operations, understand the extent and details of damage, and to help open bridges, roads, and ports. Robots would not have been able to prevent the drownings where rhw vast majority of loss of life occurred due to the tsunami, however the disruption within the affected region threatened hospitals and medical care. The ability of responders to reach the distressed was impacted by damage to the transportation infrastructure. In particular, the underwater portions of highway and railway bridges are susceptible to damage, with robots offering an alternative to manual inspection by divers. Transportation by ground and water is especially important for transporting food and relief supplies. It is also essential from the resumption of economic activities as seen by the Port of Hachinohe's immediate interest in robotics and the work at Minamisanriku and Rikuzentakata.
Second, government officials, fire rescue teams, and vulnerable industries, such as the nuclear industry at Fukushima (but also the mining industry internationally [4] ), are not sufficiently aware of robots and how they can assist with response and recovery operations. The city of Minamisanriku used ROVs to reopen New Port in time for the salmon fishing season only because IRS professors contacted city officials directly. The idea for using a UAV at Fukushima originated with Honeywell, not the nuclear industry. Even within the IEEE Robotics and Automation Society, there was confusion over the state of the practice in disaster robotics and Japanese officials were not made aware of possible resources.
Third, neither the responders nor the robotics industry are well-trained or rapidly deployable for actual events. The robotics community does not have excess capacity; T-Hawks and SeaBotix ROVs had to be taken out of service. This was not just CRASAR's experience, for example iRobot in anticipation of using the Packbot robots at Fukushima had to go into emergency production. Even if robots are available, expertise to use them may not be on hand. Westinghouse contracted with Honeywell pilots for the T-Hawk UAVs and CRASAR brought ROV experts but this was not the case for ground robots. TEPCO declined the offer of iRobot and QinetiQ to supply trained operators with their robots, instead TEPCO workers required a month of training before deploying the robots.
Barriers
The barriers to the effective use of robots can be grouped into four categories: delays in deploying robots, localized awareness of robots, corporate preparedness, and lack of data to inform future designs and deployments. These are described below.
1 Delays in Deploying Robots
There are numerous delays in deploying robots. One source of delay is the need for an official invitation. Without an official invitation, the robotics team is not covered by Good Samaritan laws and may be arrested as "self-responding," which is now considered equivalent to active interference with a response. Self-responding also places demands on the local infrastructure for food, water, and transportation resources. However, approaching an agency or municipality after the disaster has occurred rarely results in an invitation as the incident commanders are overwhelmed with the needs of the response and do not have time to consider radically new ideas. An official invitation is not sufficient, as seen with the tsunami response, travel was delayed when a different set of officials held our travel.
Assuming that a robotics group has an invitation, there may be issues with funding. The contract with Westinghouse took days to finalize and the NSF RAPID grant took weeks to process. NSF funding is only for activities with clear scientific merit. Gathering data on human-robot interaction and robot performance in extreme conditions has historically been sufficient justification but the funding is small, short term, and not enough to cover a comprehensive disaster response and recovery plan. A company can send one or two robots and an operator but they cannot donate larger amounts of resources or spin up production to build robots with no return on the investment. There needs to be a sustainable funding mechanism for deploying rescue robots.
A third source of delay is transportation and logistics. CRASAR, like other non-governmental organizations, takes commercial transport. An unmanned water surface vehicle would have been extremely useful but the size and weight configuration, which was suitable for military air transport, could not be accommodated by commercial airlines. Shipping by boat would have taken weeks. Selecting or packaging robots and gear to fit airlines standards is not the whole answer, as these incur significant weight penalties. Regulations make robot transport difficult. Fears of terrorism now prevent using air shipping without a prohibitively lengthy application process per airline. Some airlines may not permit transporting the specialized batteries used by most robots, or are inconsistent allowing batteries for a portion of the trip but not all. As seen at the Fukushima response, ITAR restrictions may apply. Ground transportation to the affected site is another challenge. Whereas "box trucks" for hauling goods and materials can be easily rented in the USA, they are scarce in Japan. Even gear that fits a US passenger vehicle may not fit in the smaller Japanese equivalent as seen in Fig. 3. 
2 Localized Awareness of Robots
A second barrier is that if there is an awareness of what robots can do, it is generally local to a few officials or industries while the larger set of beneficiaries remain unaware. The Great East Japan earthquake had many missed opportunities because only a few agencies, municipalities, or industries were familiar with the current state of robots or receptive when contacted. The Japanese Coast Guard had experimented with ROVs a decade or so earlier but had not kept up with the advances in the technology; thus they were surprised to witness at Rikuzentakata how the technology had evolved and began identifying missions for the IRS-CRASAR to execute. The citizens of Matsushima learned of underwater robots and how they could assist with victim recovery well after the ROV sonar would be helpful in locating missing family members; after two weeks, flesh immersed in water decays to the point that it no longer reflects sonar. Familiarity with one type of robot does not ensure familiarity with all types of robots; the Westinghouse-led team of experts considered how to best use UGVs and UAVs but were unaware of UMVs.
3 Lack of Corporate Preparedness
A third barrier to rapid, effective deployment of robots is the lack of availability of robots and operators who are trained both in how to use the robots and in emergency response. As noted earlier, companies do not have excess capacity. The T-Hawks, ROVs, and AUV had to be taken out of service and allocated to the response. This means the Roboticists Without Borders volunteers not only donated their time and equipment but doubly so as they had to delay jobs that they were working on. Clearly, this type of commitment is extraordinary and not sustainable. Several companies have declined to join Roboticists Without Borders because they cannot imagine ever having enough resources to donate time and equipment.
Having sufficient robots and available personnel at the time of a disaster is not enough, both robots and people must be suited for the disaster. Not all robots are useful for a disaster and guidelines for matching a particular style and size of robot to an event are described in Ref. [5] . Operators need to be familiar with emergency operations, which are often quite different than military operations, and at least one robotics team has been arrested at a site for violating procedures. Roboticists Without Borders hosts online and in person training sessions for volunteers to introduce them to in-cident management command, responder expectations and working conditions, and to practice using robots in high fidelity conditions.
4 Lack of Data
A fourth barrier to the adoption of disaster robots is the lack of data from an actual event to inform future designs and deployments. Performance data including failures, descriptions of the robot's operational envelop and the operator's workspace, systems issues such as packaging and transportation, and general human-robot interaction data are essential to building the next generation of hardening and more useful robots. Yet little data from the use of any robots at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident has been released. The primary data has come from research-oriented groups such as CRASAR, IRS, the NifTi project [6] , and DLR [7] . Sometimes an agency has data on the use of robots but no means of analyzing it, such as with the US Mine Safety and Health Administration without academic help [4] . In either case, data has to be collected, made available, analyzed, and the results disseminated in order to benefit the emergency and robotics communities.
Recommendations
CRASAR and the RWB program combined with ad hoc participation in disasters by other academic institutions, especially IRS, and robotics industry have done a credible job of supplying robots and trained personnel but these efforts are not scalable and cannot overcome the significant barriers to deployment. Therefore, these recommendations are offered to start a dialog on speeding adoption: -The United Nations assume a secretariat role similar to the UN International Search and Rescue Advisory Group giving countries a forum for contributing robotics expertise to a disaster, creating standards for robots and robot teams, developing protocols for coordinating robotics resources, and resolving regulatory dilemmas. Countries with robotics capabilities designate a disaster robotics focal point and engage their equivalent of the State and Commerce Departments to support robotics efforts. This would greatly speed up deployment by reducing the time to obtain an official invitation and overcoming international regulations and give the teams access to governmental transportation and logistics arrangements. It would also help broaden awareness of disaster robotics. -Countries endow "living caches" of assets at centers of excellence, such as CRASAR and IRS, so that the best proven technology is available 24/7 and data is collected, archived, and analyzed. Living caches acknowledge that robotics is a rapidly evolving field and platforms and software can be outdated with 18 months. Rather than buy robots for a cache to set idle for years, only to find the technology outdated and operator skills rusty, an alternative would be to lease the robots, create high fidelity computer simulations for constant practice, and have experts participate in annual physical exercises. The robots can be evaluated using the evolving ASTM E54.08 international standards on robotics. This recommendation would resolve the funding and lack of access to data barrier. -The international centers of excellence work together to create and continuously revise emergency management outreach short courses to educate government and industry officials on what robots can do. These can be distributed internally within the host country and through the United Nations. The Great East Japan saw an unprecedented use of ground, aerial, and marine robots for response and recovery. It is hoped that the lessons learned will reduce the loss of life and accelerate economic recovery for future disasters.
